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The contagion aspects of the financial and exchange-rate crises in
recent years demonstrate the need to extend the domain of macroeco-
nomic policy from the national dimension to the regional one. This paper
presents the main concepts and challenges behind macroeconomic policy
cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean and evaluates them from
a game-theory perspective. Under certain conditions related to the debate
on optimal currency areas, entering into a cooperative dynamic will be ben-
eficial for all participants. Moreover, it is shown that because the welfare
gains from regional cooperation are endogenous, cooperation will eventu-
ally become stable, even in the presence of a Prisoner’ s Dilemma. Albeit
promising at the subregional level, however, the initial conditions observed
in Latin America are still far from the conditions of self-sustained dynamics.
At the initial stage of coordination, cooperation is unstable, and a formal
institutional setting is needed to start and coordinate the cooperative
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The early 1990s opened a new era for the analysis of
economic interactions among the Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Shocks were transmitted by two
channels: real and financial. Intra-regional trade recu-
perated strongly thanks to the wave of trade liberaliza-
tion and the resumption of economic growth after the
“lost decade” that marked the 1980s. The first years of
the 1990s also coincided with the large scale introduc-
tion of new financial instruments that allowed opera-
tors to trade riskier papers, opening the door to an
active market of financial titles issued by the so-called
“emerging economies”. As a result of this innovation,
the settlement of the old debt problem through the
Brady agreement, and an increasing flow of foreign
direct investment, the net transfer of resources to the
region became once again positive, and growth
resumed. 
But the resumption of growth was accompanied
by higher volatility, due to the nature of the new inter-
national financial market, where contagion and herd-
ing have become a prominent reality. As a result,
shocks initiating in one country will have direct
impacts upon trade and other real variables, financial
spreads and exchange rates in its neighbouring geo-
graphical area, as well as upon the international busi-
ness climate, if the troubled country is large enough
(e.g., Argentina, Brazil or Mexico). This common des-
tiny, in spite of differences in policies or fundamentals
from one country to another, is a clear symptom of the
emergence of a subregional dimension as a result of
trade integration and financial globalization (Studart,
2002)
Because of this common component, national
macroeconomic stability (including its real aspects)
should now be treated as a regional public good. The
existence of such externalities calls for more coordi-
nation of national economic policies in the region.
Despite these interdependencies, and notwithstanding
major initiatives to promote macroeconomic coordina-
tion in several subregions of Latin America and the
Caribbean, cooperation does not always emerge natu-
rally, even though it would be optimal for it to do so.
Reflecting on this situation, Escaith, Ghymers and
Studart (2002) state that “it is striking that there is no
systematic, operational regional or subregional
scheme to deal with these regional or subregional
spillovers… Indeed, economic policies are still totally
uncoordinated and all the decisions continue to be
taken in close-knit national circles without considering
any spillovers at all. The clearest symptom of this is
the choice of exchange-rate regimes based on strictly
national considerations.”
In other words, and considering the macro-eco-
nomic coordination problem from a game-theory per-
spective, it is obvious that the dominant “non-coordi-
nated” strategies adopted by the countries of Latin
America and the Caribbean do not coincide with the
social optimum that could be achieved by incorporat-
ing regional cooperation. Ghymers (2001) considers
that most institutional failures from a regional coordi-
nation perspective can be analyzed from the Prisoner’s
Dilemma perspective. 
Starting from this premise, the present essay
shows that, by incorporating recent conceptual
advances in the theory of currency unions, macroeco-
nomic coordination within regional integration
schemes provides a feasible and robust solution to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The criteria for the existence of a
solution are then compared with the statistical regular-
ities observed in the region. Finally, section IV
describes the institutional settings that would make
possible such coordination, and section V synthesizes
the main findings.
This paper is based on a number of separate contributions made to
a research agenda on regional integration, exchange rate regimes
and macroeconomic coordination, implemented in the framework
of the ECLAC/European Commission Macroeconomic Dialogue
Network (REDIMA). The arguments presented here benefited
greatly from the discussions, comments and suggestions of
Christian Ghymers, Igor Paunovic and Rogerio Studart, as well as
the network participants. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for
any remaining errors and analytical gaps.
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As described in Ghymers (2001), one of the main
obstacles to regional cooperation is the belief that
there is a conflict between national interest and region-
al integration. According to this author, although most
governments understand that coordinated policies
would, in a perfect world, be the most suitable way of
dealing with the issues and challenges presented by
globalization, practical criteria lead them to imple-
ment non-coordinated policies aimed at optimizing
purely national and short-sighted objectives. This situ-
ation, where individual rationality impedes coordina-
tion, is known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
1. Cooperation and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma is an unfortunate
social situation where myopic and selfish attitudes
dominate, despite the fact that cooperation would be
the best policy from a social perspective. In other
words, it is a game where each player has an incentive
to play in a non-cooperative way, either because play-
ing dirty maximizes one’s personal reward if the other
party plays fair (i.e., follows a cooperative strategy),
or minimizes one’s losses if the other party decides to
defect from the cooperative agreement and plays dirty
himself. 
The name comes from a story used by A.W.
Tucker. Two suspects are taken into custody, cannot
communicate with each other, and have two options:
either to confess or not to confess the crime. If both
confess, they will receive a jail sentence of five years.
If neither confesses, they will probably be convinced
of minor offences and receive a one-year sentence
each. But if one confesses and the other does not, the
suspect who confesses will be set free, while the other
will receive a ten-year sentence. In this game, the
dominant individual (non-cooperative) strategy is not
to trust the other prisoner and confess to avoid the
maximum punishment. 
Technically, the equilibrium in this game is not a
Pareto optimum: both players would be better off it
they opt for not confessing. Table 1 represents sym-
bolically the strategies and outcomes of a 2x2 ordinal
game that leads to a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Strategies C
are for cooperation, and D for defection. R stands for
the reward for mutual cooperation, T for the tempta-
tion to defect from that approach, P for the punishment
in the event of mutual defection, and S for the sucker’s
payoff to the player who cooperates when the other
does not.
TABLE  1
Symbolic representation of a 2x2 Prisoner's
Dilemma game
Player A \  B Cooperate (C) Defect (D)
Cooperate (C) (R,R) (S,T)
Defect (D) (T,S) (P,P)
Source: Prepared by the author.
A game is basically defined as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma when, for both players, T>R>P>S.1 This
ranking ensures that each player has a dominant strat-
egy that results in an equilibrium with a Pareto-inferi-
or outcome. In such a situation, players – be they indi-
viduals, firms or States – that follow the irrefutable
logic of purely rational and selfish strategies may find
themselves caught in a sub-optimal situation. 
Hence, it is not easy to attain spontaneously a
cooperative equilibrium. Unless there is a credible and
enforceable commitment on the part of the players, or
coordination by an external referee, cooperation will
remain elusive, even if the players are allowed to com-
municate with each other in advance: each player has
an incentive to play in a non-cooperative way. When
generalized to more than two players, this becomes a
version of the so-called “Tragedy of the Commons”
II
Macroeconomic coordination, 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and the problem 
of inefficient equilibrium
1 Another condition, applying to repeated games, is that the play-
ers cannot get out of their dilemma by taking turns to randomly
exploit each other. This means that R>(T+S)/2 (Axelrod, 1984).
(Hardin, 1968). Decisions that are rational from the
point of view of each individual become defective
from the collective point of view.
One way out of the dilemma is to consider that
the players have the option of building agreements
through communication. Clearly, if the parties are able
to negotiate a binding agreement, the dilemma disap-
pears. Penalties may be built in to punish uncoopera-
tive behaviour, so that for each player R>T>P>S.
Obviously, in the case of sovereign countries, which
are the actors to be considered in the macroeconomic
coordination game, international agreements-cum-
penalties (such as the Maastricht Treaty in Europe) are
not always legally enforceable, and could be subject to
abrogation or renegotiation if one party considers that
its “higher” State interests are at stake. 
Thus, communication by itself does not solve the
dilemma in this context, and the problem of govern-
ments is how to make credible commitments. This typ-
ical macro-policy problem could also be studied from
the game-theory point of view. Indeed, it is still possi-
ble to reach a cooperative outcome without a formal
binding contract, when games are considered in a
dynamic perspective. Time is an important factor is
resolving cooperation deficits. The fact that players
have to meet again and again pave the way for “nice”
strategies to develop, even when players are selfish:
cooperation is based upon self-interest, without the aid
of central or supra-national authorities. Two key req-
uisites for cooperation to thrive in this context are that
the cooperation must be based on reciprocity, and the
weight of future outcomes must be important enough
to make this reciprocity stable. 
Players in real life, be they individuals, firms, or
countries, do not play the game just once, but interact
over and over again. Thus, each player can develop a
reputation and earn credibility 2 about his behaviour
and learn about other players’ conduct. The players not
only learn about each other’s behaviour, but also
become capable of rewarding cooperative forms of
conduct (strategy C) or punishing uncooperative ones
(D). 
This strategy is called the Tit-for-Tat strategy:
player A starts out cooperating, and continues to do so
as long as the other player B cooperates. If B does not
cooperate and plays the D strategy, there is still time to
counter attack with one’s own D strategy, and avoid
the disastrous CD or DC outcomes.  This Tit-for-Tat
strategy is the best alternative when games are infi-
nitely repeated or at least repeated with a sufficient
number of iterations. When games are finite, however,
there is a high probability that the other (perfectly
rational) player will use the selfish and uncooperative
strategy in the last occurrence of the game, since the
other player does not have the possibility to retaliate.
Because of the same reasoning, there will be no coop-
eration at the next-to-last occurrence, and so on. 
However, cooperation may prevail, because in
real life the hypothesis of pure rationality and pure
selfishness is not always representative of the actual
behaviour of players. As demonstrated by Axelrod
(1984), cooperation can emerge even in a world of
unconditional defection, if at least some of the players
are willing to initiate the game using a cooperative
(“nice”) strategy. Cooperation can evolve from small
clusters of individuals who base their cooperation on
reciprocity and have even a small proportion of their
interaction with each other. In the author’s words “The
most promising finding is that, if the facts of
Cooperation Theory are known by the participants
with foresight, the evolution of cooperation can be
speeded-up.” (Axelrod, 1984, p.24).
2. Costs and benefits of coordination 
The technical part of the discussion about the benefits
and costs associated with macroeconomic coordina-
tion is usually analysed from the standpoint of the
Optimal Currency Areas criteria (OCA).3 Countries
considering whether to adopt the currency of a third
country (e.g., dollarization) or to join a currency union
(e.g., the European Economic and Monetary Union)
weigh the potential benefits against the expected costs.
Since Mundell (1961) developed the concept of OCA,
the criteria are defined in terms of trade relationship
and symmetry or asymmetry of external shocks. The
greater the linkage, the more desirable a union; to
compensate for imperfections in the first two criteria,
two additional ones are considered: degree of labour
mobility and/or system of fiscal transfers.
In the Mundell-Fleming model, then, the nature
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2 The concepts of reputation and credibility in game theory are
very complex and require assumptions about the degree of rational-
ity of players, asymmetric information, the different characters of
the players, and many other ingredients. Since our purpose is only
to present basic concepts of game theory, we have tried to make all
this as simple as possible.
3 See Escaith and Paunovic (2003) for examples of fiscal coopera-
tion.
of the exchange rate regime determines the degree of
freedom for using monetary policy as a response to
external (real) shocks.  In a pegged regime, a shock
would be transmitted directly to the economy through
the reduction/increase in international reserves and the
resulting reduction/increase in the money supply and
hence, given nominal rigidities, in aggregate demand.
A flexible exchange rate would permit more flexible
use of monetary policy to counteract the external
shock and adjust relative prices, at the expense of
higher inflation levels. 
According to Mundell (1961),4 currency area
optimality occurs when the benefits of relinquishing
the exchange rate as an internal adjustment instrument
outweigh the costs of adopting a single currency in a
fixed exchange regime. These criteria indicate the spe-
cific conditions under which it is advantageous for a
group of economies to adopt a single currency, based
on an analysis of the (microeconomic) gains of effi-
ciency and the (macroeconomic) costs of the loss of
flexibility. 
The usefulness/sustainability of an OCA is often
determined as a function of labour mobility, economic
size and openness, similarity of production structure
and the symmetry (or asymmetry) of economic
shocks. Deep trade interrelationships, symmetrical
exposure to external shocks and synchronization of
business cycles increase the expected net benefits of
adopting a common currency and a common monetary
policy. Indeed, shocks affecting all the countries in a
similar fashion, at the same point in their business
cycle, do not call for a change in exchange rates.
Labour market flexibility and mobility reduce the real
adjustment costs when shocks and cycles are not per-
fectly symmetrical, while the existence of fiscal com-
pensation schemes opens up the possibility of transfers
between losers and winners.
Despite their theoretical interest and the qualita-
tive guidance they provide, the practical usefulness of
OCA criteria is limited. In particular, they are not fully
operational for decision-making purposes, as in prac-
tice they cannot be used to quantify a balance of costs
and benefits (McCallum, 1999). Moreover, a more
recent trend in the literature centres on two empirical
questions that reassess the relevance of the above-
mentioned OCA criteria.
The first of these questions examines the problem
of the balance between costs and benefits by revising
the actual cost for a country of losing the ability to use
the exchange rate as a policy instrument and looks at
the effectiveness of nominal adjustments of the
exchange rate. When an economy suffers a nominal
shock, adjusting parities is not an adequate instrument,
and a regime with a fixed exchange rate will do better
in terms of welfare.5 Indeed, the exchange rate is
potentially useful as an instrument in situations when
shocks are simultaneously country-specific, real and
temporary. According to this literature, the probability
of such situations is becoming smaller as trade inte-
gration reduces the significance of national borders
and as stability-oriented policies curtail policy-
induced shocks. Furthermore, contemporary advo-
cates of monetary unions think that the pure and per-
fect exchange-rate flexibility option is not the correct
alternative when discussing costs and benefits of
OCAs, because modern-day trade and financial inter-
relationships make pure flexibility a nonviable option
(Buti and Sapir, 1998).
The second “revisionist” trend in the OCA litera-
ture is of special interest from the point of view of the
present essay. Regional trade integration increases
business-cycle correlation and promotes new institu-
tional initiatives that will set up a positive feedback
loop for intraregional trade itself. Thus, cooperation
creates its own conditions of sustainability. In the fol-
lowing section, we will discuss these aspects in greater
detail and show how they apply to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma issue.
3. Dynamic gains from regional coordination 
of macroeconomic policies
As already noted, recent developments in the positive
theory of OCA and the European Monetary Union
(EMU) experience show that the optimality criteria are
in fact endogenous. As stated by Frankel and Rose
(1996), and as illustrated by the case of the European
Union, the suitability of OCA criteria cannot be judged
on the basis of historical data, since the structure of the
national economies – especially their trade structure –
will be affected by the creation of a currency area and
is likely to change. In those authors’ words, the OCA
criteria are jointly endogenous: 
“Countries are likely deliberately to link their
currencies to those of some of their most important
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4 McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) are also important contrib-
utors to the standard literature on OCAs. 5 See Parrado and Velasco (2002).
trading partners, in order to capture gains associated
with greater exchange rate stability. In doing so, they
lose the ability to set monetary policy independently
of those neighbors. The fact that their monetary policy
will be closely tied to that of their neighbors could
result in an observed positive association between
trade link and income links. In other words, the asso-
ciation could be the result of countries’ application of
the OCA criterion, rather than an aspect of economic
structure that is invariant to the exchange rate
regimes.” (p. 15).
As a consequence, the authors state in their con-
clusion (p. 22) that “some countries may appear, on
the basis of historical data, to be poor candidates for
EMU entry. But EMU entry per se, for whatever rea-
son, may provide a substantial impetus for trade
expansion; this in turn may result in more highly cor-
related business cycles. That is, a country is more like-
ly to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union
ex post than ex ante.”
In this endogenous framework, regional monetary
and exchange rate coordination can be represented by a
new kind of a non-zero sum game, where the positive
outcome increases when the game is repeated: the more
you play, the more you gain. Because of objective rea-
sons, linked to the OCA criteria (weaknesses of trade
and financial integration, asymmetry of business
cycles), and subjective factors (reduced credibility of
regional commitments and weak institutional enforce-
ment procedures), initial gains from consensuating
regional policy response to external shocks may be low
compared with the outcome of non-cooperative strate-
gies. We recognize here the typical Prisoner’s Dilemma
problem, where the structure of incentives is perverse.
But because of the endogenous nature of the OCA cri-
teria, as time goes by and the more countries interact,
the higher is the welfare gain obtained from coordina-
tion and the lower the temptation to defect. 
If we go back to the formal representation of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (table 1), the gain from coopera-
tion R(t) depends positively on the number of times
the game is repeated (t). 
dR/dt > 0
Figure 1 gives a tree representation of this game.
The first letter in parentheses denotes the strategy of
A, while the second is the strategy of B. For simplici-
ty, let us assume that B applies a tit-for-tat strategy.
Both countries cooperate in the initial round and gain
R0.
• If A defects in the first iteration, he gains T and B
suffers the S outcome, but both gain only P in the
second round, once B applies the tit-for-tat coun-
termove. 
• If A cooperates, both countries gain R1, with
R1>R0.
The same reasoning applies to subsequent moves,
with Rt>R(t - l ).
Thanks to the endogenous and incremental nature
of Rt in this class of games, the gains from cooperation
should increase with time such as to reach the situation
when  R(t* )>T. Remember that a Prisoner’s Dilemma
exists only when, for both players, T>R>P>S and the
dominant strategy dictates that each player should
defect and follow a non-cooperative strategy. After
repeating the game up to time t*, welfare gains from
cooperation increase to a point where defecting is no
longer the dominant strategy (see figure 2 for a graph-
ic representation of the outcome of the cooperative
game).
Obviously, the initial stages of the cooperative
game are critical for its success, when Rt is lower than
T or too close to it, thus making the net gain from
cooperation too uncertain. This caveat is particularly
important when referring to the Latin American situa-
tion, where the initial degree of trade and financial
integration is weaker than in the European case.
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Dynamic gains from cooperation and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
As already noted, despite their limitations OCA crite-
ria are a good starting point to look at the feasibility of
initiating a dynamic process of policy coordination in
a regional framework. The issue depends not only on
national considerations, but also on externalities
linked to the regional dimension of the transmission of
shocks.
The evolution of the Latin American and
Caribbean  economies since the mid-1980s shows a
convergence in terms of macroeconomic policies and
achievements. Confronted with the negative shock of
the debt crisis of 1982, the necessary adjustment fol-
lowing the reversal of net financial resource transfers
from the rest of the world and episodes of high to
hyperinflation, most countries embarked upon stabi-
lization programmes. These programmes shared a
nuclear set of common objectives, strategies and
instruments. The increased dependence on external
finance during the 1990s also led to a reduction in the
freedom of domestic policy makers to diverge from
orthodox policies.
The trend not only affected macroeconomic poli-
cies stricto sensu, but also brought a deeper transfor-
mation of the institutional framework via structural
reforms. The evolution of reform indexes (ECLAC,
2001) shows that by the end of the 1990s most Latin
American and Caribbean countries had achieved con-
vergence in terms of trade, financial and capital liber-
alization reforms. 
As a result of these trends, most of the countries
of the region entered the 2000s with many shared
characteristics, not only in their way of thinking about
making economic policies, but also in the results –both
positive and negative– of those policies. Sharing com-
mon objectives, institutional frameworks and instru-
ments provides quite fertile ground for macroeconom-
ic policy coordination. Whether it is optimal to inte-
grate this dimension into the national strategies
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Source: Escaith and Paunovic (2003).
III
Economic convergence, integration and policy
coordination in Latin America
FIGURE  3
Integration schemes: Trade within subregions, in relation to total exports
(Percentages)
Source: ECLAC (2002a).
depends in part on the comparative review of their
exposure to external shocks. The first aspect to be ana-
lyzed is trade integration.
1. Trade integration
One of the central factors in macroeconomic policy
coordination and OCA is the degree of trade interrela-
tionship between potential partner countries through-
out the trade sector. This is traditionally analyzed in
terms of trade flows and symmetry of external shocks.
a) Intraregional trade
Since 1991, with the recovery from the 1982 debt
crisis, trade with other Latin American and Caribbean
countries, especially within integration subregions
(Andean Community, CARICOM, Central American
Common Market, Mercosur), has increased much
faster than trade with other countries, at least up to
1998. Thus, intraregional trade, which represented
13% of total exports in 1991, rose to 20% in 1998: an
implicit growth rate of almost 15% annually in real
terms. Due to the crisis in Mercosur and a decline in
the Andean group, this share went down to 16% in
2002, reducing the annual growth rate over the 1991-
2002 period to 9% (table 2). This growth is particular-
ly significant from our perspective, because trade has
grown much more rapidly than the domestic product,
increasing its contribution to the level of economic
activity.
TABLE  2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends in
trade and domestic product, 1991-2002
Latin America Average annual growth rate
a
and the Caribbean (LAC) 1991-1998 1991-2002
Total supply 4.5 3.3
GDP 3.3 2.5
Imports of goods and services 12.0 8.0
Exports of goods and services 8.5 7.3
Exports to other 
Latin American countries b 14.8 9.2
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of ECLAC data. 
a Percent, from data at constant 1995 prices
b Estimated from data at current prices.
Economic transactions within each subregional
integration scheme have been taking on an increasingly
important role (figure 3), not only in quantitative but
also, and especially, in qualitative terms: while trade
with countries outside the region is composed of 
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traditional products (commodities or processed primary
products), in South America intraregional trade is based
on manufactured products, allowing national
economies to diversify their export base (Benavente,
2001). Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
countries, on the other hand, have diversified their
exports thanks to their privileged access to the United
States market (“maquiladora” industries) or their natu-
ral advantages in terms of tourism. 
This trend has two important (and potentially con-
flicting) consequences for the purposes of the present
paper. First, it increases the transmission of shocks
through trade, in the traditional OCA perspective, and
thus is a factor of greater interdependence between
countries. Second, it increases the potential for conflict
between national exchange rate policies, as these
exports consist of consumer and intermediary products
that are sensitive to relative prices. Thus, devaluation by
one of the regional trading partners could have a strong
impact on regional trade flows, triggering regional ten-
sions (as occurred in Mercosur after devaluations in
Brazil or Argentina) or competitive devaluations (as in
Europe in the late 1970s). Obviously, these cross-effects
are directly relevant to both the choice of national
exchange rate regime and the potential gains from
regional coordination.6
b) Terms of trade
In small open developing economies, terms of
trade fluctuations (variations in the prices of a coun-
try’s exports relative to those of its imports) are a
major source of instability. Structural characteristics
make export prices very volatile because of the high
proportion of commodities and there is little capacity
for substituting imports internally (because of their
higher technological content), even when their relative
prices increase. Non-transitory shifts in relative prices,
as exemplified by structural trends in terms of trade is
an issue that has been receiving attention for quite a
long time.7
Short-term fluctuations in relative prices are per-
haps more damaging to investment than long-term
trends, as volatility increases systemic uncertainty and
diminishes the capacity for sound decision-making.
These fluctuations are also more relevant when it comes
to macroeconomic policy coordination, especially when
the explicit objective of that policy is to stabilize nomi-
nal and real variables, i.e., to smooth out high-frequen-
cy fluctuations.
As shown in figure 4, the dynamics of terms of
trade has been quite different across countries over the
past ten years in terms of trends8 and volatility. As an
annual average over the 1991-2002 period, six countries
out of nineteen suffered negative shocks and eleven had
positive ones. This resulted in a small positive annual
average of 0.2% for the region as a whole (0.6% as a
simple average of individual countries), the extremes
ranging from –2.4% (Nicaragua) to 3.7% (Venezuela).
Volatility is very different from country to country,
with standard deviations ranging from as low as 2.6 in
Mexico, which has the advantage of a diversified export
structure, to as high as 21.6 in Venezuela, a mono-
exporter of oil. The volatility for consolidated exports is
low for the region as a whole (3.4 when all exports are
consolidated), but reaches 8.1 if computed as a simple
average of the countries.
Looking at the correlation between countries, one
notes that most countries in the region share a common
positive interdependence, while a small group evi-
dences diverging behaviour. This is best seen from sec-
tion B of figure 4, which shows the clustering of the
Latin American and Caribbean countries according to a
breakdown of the principal components of their terms
of trade variations. On the first two axes, which jointly
explain 65% of total variance, one may note a first clus-
ter of countries in the northwest quadrant, composed of
Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina and, to a lesser degree,
Colombia and Mexico. These are oil-exporting coun-
tries. Panama is isolated because of its specificity as a
processing and transit zone.
Except for Bolivia, all the other countries of the
region are clustered into a compact group in the western
part of the figure. This cluster includes all the countries
in the Central American Common Market and almost
all the Mercosur countries except Argentina. This
means that the countries from these two integration
areas share the same (short-term) trends for terms-of-
trade variations, which is an important basis for coordi-
nating a regional response to common external shocks.
The situation of the Andean countries is more diversi-
fied from this point of view, because of their respective
specialization in oil exports (Ecuador and Venezuela,
but also Colombia) or in other minerals (Bolivia, Peru).
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6 See CEI (2003) for a review of the cooperation issues from a
Mercosur perspective.
7 See Ocampo and Parra (2003).
8 The term “trends” is used here in the sense of tendency, and does
not refer to what statisticians may understand by deterministic
trends (e.g., in contrast to random movements).
FIGURE  4
Latin America and the Caribbean: Terms of Trade, 1991-2001
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of ECLAC data. 
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c) Effective exchange rates
Exposure to common terms-of-trade shocks and
stronger intraregional trade should lead to greater co-
variation of effective real exchange rates (ERERs).
The calculation of these rates takes into account the
evolution of the country’s bilateral exchange rates in
relation to each of its trading partners, correcting for
differences in the respective domestic rates of inflation
and weighting for the relative importance of the trad-
ing partner in a country’s total trade.
The ERER is a widely accepted measure of short-
term macroeconomic competitiveness. As such, it is an
important indicator to monitor in any trade integration
scheme: when the ERER rises (or decreases), the
country in question gains (or loses) competitiveness
with regard to the (weighted) average for its trading
partner. Obviously, when regional partners account for
a significant share of external trade, variations in
neighbouring countries’ exchange rates (or internal
prices) will greatly affect the overall trade competi-
tiveness of each country.
This merely quantitative and mechanical effect is
compounded by the potentially greater price elasticity
of intraregional trade. Because intraregional trade in
Latin America is more intensive in manufactured
goods, demand is potentially more sensitive to
changes in relative prices than in the case of the goods
exported to the rest of world, which in Latin America
(and especially in South America) are mainly primary
products, whose prices are set internationally. The
firms that participate in intraregional commerce are in
general smaller than those trading with the rest of the
world and more sensitive to transitory changes in rel-
ative prices. 
Correlation coefficients between the exchange
rates of the Latin American and Caribbean countries
were calculated from 1992 up to the first semester of
2003 for the quarterly variations of four categories of
real exchange rates: i) the bilateral rate with the United
States economy, ii) the effective rate with regional
trading partners (a weighted average of the bilateral
exchange rate, adjusted by the difference in inflation
rates), iii) the effective rate with non-regional trading
partners (excluding the United States of America), and
iv) the effective exchange rate for all trading partners
(regional and non-regional). Contemporary correlation
coefficients were calculated, thus capturing only the
direct and most observable effects. The trading part-
ners were weighted by their exports to the reporting
country.
The correlation coefficients obtained for the
ERER with regional partners are the most interesting
in the present case, as they reflect the intensity of the
shocks passed from one country of the region to the
others through the exchange rate, either by trade or by
other causes. They are clearly a prime indicator of
macroeconomic integration. When there are close
trade relationships within a subregional integration
scheme, a positive impulse in one country (a gain in
exchange rate competitiveness) should result in a neg-
ative one in the regional trading partners.
By construction, because of the symmetry of
trade relationships, the sum of the correlation coeffi-
cients is close to zero when considering all the Latin
American and Caribbean  countries that enter in the
calculation of the regional ERER. The closer the intra-
regional trade relationship, the higher the positive and
negative variations. But part of the interaction ana-
lyzed through the behaviour of regional ERERs may
be due to a third, external, factor to which all countries
in the region react simultaneously (an external shock
of large magnitude, such as the Asian and Russian
crises of 1997-1998, for example). To filter out this
noise, the correlation coefficients obtained for real
exchange rates with the US dollar were subtracted
from the results obtained with the regional ERER. An
index was constructed using the sum of the absolute
values of the results obtained for each country, nor-
malized by the total across countries (figure 5).
As expected, the largest countries of the region
(Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) are among those
showing the greatest interaction with the rest of Latin
America and the Caribbean. Great care should be
taken not to draw definitive conclusions from this
index, however. Despite the filtering process used, the
index remains subject to “spurious” correlation effects
which affect9 the results, Also, the index is better cal-
culated on  “normal years”, because great asymmetri-
cal shocks affecting a smaller economy may create
noise in the indexing procedure. For example,
Uruguay has been closely integrated into the Mercosur
economy and ranked high in the index calculated from
1992 up to 2001 (6.6). The large devaluation of 2002
had no significant impact on the effective exchange
rate of Uruguay’ s trade partners, due to the small size
of its economy, and the resulting effect was a drop of
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9 For example, higher international oil prices can affect the nomi-
nal exchange rate of oil exporting countries, such as Venezuela, and
the internal rate of inflation of importers, thus affecting simultane-
ously the ERER of both exporters and importers, even if they do not
have close economic relations.
FIGURE  5
Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional exchange rate integration index
Source: Prepared by the author.
more than two points in its integration index (to 4.4)
when the 2002 and 2003 periods are incorporated. 
Another conclusion may be drawn when looking
at the ERER with non-regional trading partners
(excluding the USA). It is striking that i) most ele-
ments of the correlation matrix are positive and ii)
many have a high value compared with the regional
ERER and the bilateral US dollar tables. This intuition
is confirmed when principal component analysis is
applied to the real exchange rate variations. In this
case, the higher the co-movement among the original
series, the fewer the common factors needed to
“explain” the total variance of the sample. It is clear
from table 3 than co-movements are higher when
exchange rate variations are considered in relation
with “other” trade partners rather than with the USA or
regional partners. In the first case, the first factor
explains 40% of the variance: i.e., approximately dou-
ble the value encountered in the two other cases. The
same difference persists when considering second and
(albeit less so) third) factors.
TABLE  3
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Quarterly real exchange rate variations, 
1992-2003: principal component analysis
(Results obtained for the first four components)
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
LAC Partners
Eigenvalue 4.4 3.5 2.7 2.3
% variance 22.2 17.5 13.4 11.5
% cumulative 22.2 39.8 53.2 64.7
Bilateral with USA
Eigenvalue 3.9 2.1 2.0 1.8
% variance 19.3 10.5 10.1 8.8
% cumulative 19.3 29.8 40.0 48.7
Other trading partners
Eigenvalue 8.0 2.6 1.6 1.3
% variance 40.0 12.9 8.0 6.3
% cumulative 40.0 52.9 60.9 67.2
Source: Prepared by the author. 
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FIGURE  6
Latin America: Evolution of potential GDP, 1993-2002
It appears that most of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries share a common trend with
respect to non-US dollar currencies (basically
European and Asian currencies in our sample). This is
easily explained considering that de facto or de jure
these economies belong to the dollar area, and thus
tend to share the same exchange rate fluctuations with
other international currencies.
2. Internal economic cycles
In the previous sections, we looked at the transmission
of shocks via terms-of-trade or exchange-rate channels.
In view of the high external vulnerability of the region,
these shocks would be expected to have an impact on
short-term growth dynamics. In the present section, we
will look into the coincidence of the “real cycles” with-
in the region.10
Two set of indicators are used for this purpose, one
being the quarter-to-quarter seasonally adjusted GDP
growth rate, and the other the size of the output gap.
These were calculated by reference to a medium-term
tendency obtained by smoothing real GDP time series,
applying the widely used Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to
the data. A standard value of 1600 was utilized to para-
meterize the filter, and the quarterly series were extrap-
olated at both ends of the sample, to reduce the well-
known end-point sensibility of the HP filter.
Tendencies for GDP growth using the filtered
series capture the medium-term trends observed during
the 1990s up to 2002. Figure 6 shows two different
dynamics at the beginning of the present decade. The
low-growth subset was composed of South American
countries severely hit by the 1997-1999 crisis that
affected many emerging economies. This crisis affected
in particular the Southern Cone economies, especially
in the context of the Argentine turmoil in 2001-2002.
Mexico and the Caribbean and Central American coun-
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10 In this purely descriptive context, “real cycles” should be under-
stood as GDP fluctuations around an observed trend, and do not
refer to the source (monetary or real) of the observed fluctuation. 
For a more in-depth study on cycle co-movements in Latin America,
see Cerro and Pineda (2002).
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data provided by the ECLAC Economic Projections Centre.
tries were able to escape the 1997-1999 turbulence
thanks to their closer links to the booming United States
economy and lesser dependence on exports based on
primary products. When the USA, together with other
industrialized economies, eventually went into reces-
sion in the second half of 2001, this difference vanished.
Analysis of short-term GDP fluctuations con-
firms this heterogeneity. The quarterly GDP variations
show little correlation across the region as a whole,
confirming the results obtained by Cerro and Pineda
(2002). An interesting pattern emerges, however,
when looking at i) the evolution of the correlation over
the 1993-2002 period and ii) the situation within each
of the subregions. Not only is the correlation higher
when calculated within each subregion, but it also
increases over time (table 4).
TABLE  4
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Quarterly GDP variations, 1993-2002
(Inter-country correlation coefficients)
Correlation within Correlation
each subregion within 
Average correlation LAC region
within: Average
Period averages: Mercosur Andean Meso-
Group Americaa
Total 1993-2002 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.11
1993-1997 -0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.05
1998-2002 0.31 0.20 0.19 0.16
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of ECLAC data .
aMexico, Central America and Dominican Republic.
Review of the correlation coefficients obtained
for the output gaps (percentage difference between
potential and observed GDP) shows that the moderate
co-variation of economic activity across the region is
nevertheless higher than the coincidence observed in
output gaps. This is confirmed by the results of the
principal component analysis. As shown in table 5, the
first factor has a greater representation power in the
case of quarterly variation of total GDP, compared to
the output gaps.
These results indicate that although the co-varia-
tion of economic activity in the region is still diffuse,
it has been increasing over the period studied and in
general the Latin American and Caribbean countries
have tended to cluster around common subregional
patterns. This is quite an interesting feature consider-
ing that the correlation of business cycles across
countries is an argument in favour of macroeconomic
policy coordination and optimum currency areas.11
Nevertheless, the weakness of the linkage indicates
that the Latin American region is still far from the
self-reinforcing situation corresponding to the right
part of figure 2 above ( R>T ). As a consequence,
macroeconomic coordination per se is far from being
a sufficient condition for closer integration, and more
traditional integration policies have to be maintained
and deepened.
TABLE  5
Latin America and the Caribbean: Quarterly
GDP variations and output gaps, 1993-2002
(principal components)
Factor1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor4
Quarter to 
quarter variation
Eigenvalue 4.8 2.5 1.7 1.3
% variance 34.2 17.9 12.5 9.1
% cumulative 34.2 52.2 64.6 73.8
Output Gap
Eigenvalue 3.6 2.8 2.3 1.4
% variance 25.5 19.7 16.5 10.0
% cumulative 25.5 45.2 61.7 71.7
Source: Prepared by the author.
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11 Albeit not a necessary one if one takes into consideration the
endogeneity of these OCA criteria, as we already mentioned.
In the previous sections, we have seen that the Latin
American and Caribbean economies show at least
some of the necessary conditions for benefiting from
macroeconomic cooperation, and that the expected
welfare gains are probably a positive function of time.
Despite its potential and increasing benefits, however,
initiating a programme of policy coordination is only
part of the story, as many other challenges remain. 
As analysed by Kronberger (2002), even in the
case of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria, there are
important difficulties to face, especially in the case of
emerging economies. In particular, for the endogenous
process to initiate, there is a need for a strong political
will and a firm political consensus. The following sec-
tion identifies and briefly comments on some of these
issues.
1. Uncertainty and the size of the “union”
Defining a common strategy for macroeconomic
cooperation between sovereign States faces several
obstacles in a real life situation. The first of them,
obviously, is the uncertainty about the net outcome of
cooperation (balance of costs and benefits of coopera-
tion). As we saw, both traditional and endogenous
OCA criteria provide a guide to this aspect, and the
prospects for Latin America and the Caribbean are
positive, at least at the sub-regional level.
Probably the second most important obstacle is
the uncertainty concerning the behaviour of other
players: an aspect that can be analyzed from the insti-
tutional perspective. As we mentioned earlier, this
uncertainty, which is prejudicial to a cooperative out-
come in a finite game, can be controlled and reduced
by the possibility of committing players, through an
enforceable agreement, to adopt a cooperative strate-
gy. In our present case, this would be achieved through
treaties regulating international relations between
countries, but the difficulty of enforcing contracts (i.e.,
devising penalties) among sovereign States should not
be underestimated. 
Demopoulos and Yannacopoulos (2001) incorpo-
rate this practical aspect by analyzing the costs and
benefits of macroeconomic coordination in the context
of a currency area, as a function of its size. As a cur-
rency area expands, the benefits from adopting a sin-
gle currency increase, but not as fast as the difficulties
of agreeing on a common set of policies and enforcing
them as new countries, with macroeconomic problems
of their own, join the area. Because transaction costs
are assumed to increase faster than benefits, there is an
optimum threshold in terms of the number of partici-
pating countries. 
From this brief summary it may be deduced that,
in the presence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, several key
points have to be clarified in order to advance the case
for regional cooperation on macroeconomic policy. 
The first set of critical factors relates to the nature
of costs and benefits. Cooperation should not only be
beneficial for all participants, but those benefits must
also be sufficiently larger than in the case of an alter-
native, non-cooperative approach. At the same time,
they must be easily identifiable and not too uncertain,
in order to define a clear incentive to cooperate. 
Second, it must be ensured that there are not too
many players, and that they can be induced to accept
reasonably binding commitments to cooperate.
Building an appropriate institutional framework to
provide for suitable commitment technology is a key
element in this respect.
These two argument, applied to the Latin
American and Caribbean context, point in the direc-
tion of a form of cooperation limited –at least initial-
ly– to sub-regional partners, and based on a strong
regional institutions. 
2. Credibility of national and regional
macro-policies
This institutional commitment technology needed to
increase the credibility of the decision agreed upon is
key to understanding the importance of a proper 
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IV
Institutional criteria for initiating and maintaining
coordination
institutional setting in the design of a sub-regional
coordination mechanism. This arrangement, as argued
in Escaith, Ghymers and Studart (2002), should
include the appropriate monitoring and endorse-
ment/disqualification capacities, and calls for the exis-
tence of a formal institutional arrangement at the
supra-national level. Such a mechanism must offer
national governments a set of positive and negative
incentives to cooperate in the coordination of macro-
economic policies, as well as a well-designed negotia-
tion, monitoring and reporting system that creates an
effective system of checks and balances. 
Also, this institutional commitment must be
workable and credible, which means that the condi-
tions and criteria stated earlier regarding the optimal
size of an OCA apply also to these aspects. Because
the initial benefits Rt may be low and uncertain as
long as t<t*,  a strategy of defection of one of the play-
ers due to the Prisoner's Dilemma situation is a real
possibility. Therefore, a proper formal institutional
arrangement will be vital in order for a cooperative
game to be sustained. Ideally, the institutional setting
must incorporate penalties for non-cooperative behav-
iour, in order to lower T and the temptation to defect,
as in the European case. 
Once the game has been repeated a sufficient
number of times, so that credibility has been estab-
lished and welfare gains have become clear to all
players, they will have an incentive to continue, even
when transitory conditions provide an incentive to
defect.12 In addition to the arguments of the endoge-
nous gains from cooperation,  one could add that with
the passing of time and the building-up of regional
institutions, regional integration and policy coordina-
tion gain credibility with national and international
agents: a key factor in the sustainability of national
macroeconomic. 
As noted earlier, political economy considera-
tions are taking on an increasing role in the analysis of
macroeconomic policymaking. The same trend can be
observed in applied development economics, where
research brings together the work of economists and
political scientists to focus on governance and on the
interaction of economic and political factors in the
making and working of actual policy. As often occurs
in developing countries, when competing objectives
cannot be reached simultaneously with the current set
of policy instruments, policymakers are constrained to
second-best solutions. In such a situation, competing
objectives must be reached sequentially, and short-
term deviation from pre-announced policies should
not be mistaken for an abandonment of initial goals. 
This means that the long-term commitments
announced by the policymakers must be credible.
When the national situation is less than favourable in
that respect, policy-takers may be tempted to interpret
short-term deviations from pre-announced targets by
policymakers as discretional shifts in policy, and
hedge against this risk (for example by reducing their
demand for national currency).  Bringing in the supra-
national dimension can help to avoid this outcome.
Persson and Tabellini (1990) state that the decision to
join a supra-national arrangement provides a regional
“commitment technology” that gives more credibility
to policymakers. 
By providing external auditing of the macroeco-
nomic situation, regional monitoring and analysis will
help to discriminate between exogenous and endoge-
nous policy shocks when actual inflation deviates
from the pre-established target. Provided that regional
institutions are sufficiently isolated from national
pressures, they would also be instrumental in consoli-
dating the credibility of the national institutions when
deviations between ex ante objectives and ex post
achievements are unintended and due to external fac-
tors. Being regionally negotiated and self-imposed, the
ownership factor should help in facilitating the defini-
tion of a consensus between policymakers and civil
society on the need to respect national commitments,
unlike other international monitoring arrangements
(e.g., by the International Monetary Fund).
3. The uncertainty of the model
Because the application of economic theory to real-life
situations is not always unambiguous, there is always a
probability of error when adopting a particular model.
Uncertainty about parameters and disagreement among
coalition partners about the right economic model to
follow pose a real challenge to a cooperative econom-
ic policy. Policymakers may have different beliefs
about how an economy actually works. Disagreement
is obviously not an obstacle to cooperation, but because
70
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION IN LATIN AMERICA •  HUBERT ESCAITH
C E P A L R E V I E W  8 2  •  A P R I L 2 0 0 4
12 As recently exemplified by the European case, regional commit-
ments to reduce the fiscal deficit may be counterbalanced by short-
term national considerations. Nevertheless, member countries, even
the largest ones as in the cases of France and Germany, take the
political consequences of a regional sanction very seriously and the
prospect, and hence the consequences, of a breach of the regional
rules have fuelled a strong debate in Europe.
of the uncertainty about the “true model”, negotiations
may lead to the adoption of a wrong model and result
in less welfare than non-cooperation. 
Uncertainty may reduce the present value of the
expected welfare benefits. Translated into the
Prisoner’s Dilemma perspective, a simple tit for tat
strategy to achieve cooperation is collectively stable if,
and only if, the weight of the future outcome w in
today’s decisions is large enough. 
On the other hand, –as occurs with the gradual
welfare gains from OCAs– part of this uncertainty is
endogenously determined and changes with the num-
ber of times the “coordination game” is played. In this
case, as we shall see, uncertainty is reduced through
cooperation (while the expected welfare gains from
OCAs are increased). When both policies and models
are subject to choice, policymakers have four options:
i) they may make no attempt to agree on the appropri-
ate model or to coordinate their policies; ii) they may
exchange information or bargain over the model, but
make no attempt to choose their policies jointly; iii)
they may not discuss which model should be used, but
may coordinate their policy choices explicitly (they do
not discuss the justification for their policies); and last-
ly, iv) they may agree both on the choice of the model
and on  coordination of their policies. Hughes Hallet
(1995) shows that disagreement over the model, in a
situation  of uncertainty, can still be beneficial for pol-
icymakers if it leads to an exchange of information,
thus reducing with the passing of time the risk of seri-
ous losses. 
In practice, countries that enter into an active
process of macroeconomic coordination do so after an
extensive period of dialogue, exchange of information,
mutual monitoring and convergence. The European
Union is perhaps the best example of this process of
reduction of uncertainty through the sharing of infor-
mation and mutual monitoring. In the Latin American
region, there are several examples of similar processes,
and in all subregional integration groups, national deci-
sion-makers are actively engaged in a dialogue to
reduce uncertainty concerning the key parameters of
their respective economies. 
Usually, the first step is to establish convergence
criteria for key indicators (as in the Macroeconomic
Monitoring Group (GMM) in Mercosur, or as these
indicators were set in the Andean region, the
Caribbean or the Central American Common
Market).13 This process of defining common concept
for the monitoring of the respective economies from a
regional perspective is an important step in promoting
a regional dialogue on key variables, defining trans-
parent criteria and building mutual trust among
regional partners: all aspects whose importance cannot
be underestimated.
These processes are still at an initial stage, and
more efforts should be made to define more precisely
the models underlying the national economies and
their interactions. This implies specifying the key
parameters of each national economy forming part of
the subregional group and modelling the interdepend-
ence between them. In addition, unlike the countries of
the European Union, those constituting the Latin
American and Caribbean region are developing
economies, i.e., economies where the key parameters
and the systemic response to impulses are prone to
rapid and substantial change. Thus, it is even more
important in the Latin American context than in the
European Union to maintain close monitoring of the
key indicators and foster a common programme of
analysis of the reaction functions to external and 
policy impulses.
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13 See ECLAC (2002a), Chapter V.
This article has shown that, despite favourable indica-
tions,  there is still a large gap between the actual
dynamic of shock transmission in the region and the
demanding conditions sets by pure OCA criteria, even
when considering only the subregional dimension. The
recent developments in the positive theory of endoge-
nous OCAs, however,  indicate that full observance of
the OCA concept is not a necessity for the initiation of
mutually beneficial coordination. If the dynamic of the
cooperative game works well, then the iteration of the
cooperative game should naturally guide the countries
out of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the absence of a
leader country, cooperation must begin with a (mini-
mum) consensus of the participating countries: a
process that calls for a preliminary phase of confi-
dence-building based on dialogue and exchange of
information and culminates in a regional agreement.
That agreement should include the necessary commit-
ment technology to initiate and maintain the coopera-
tive game at least in the first phase of implementation,
when benefits are still diffuse and temptation to defect
is strong. This commitment technology should there-
fore include features that increase both the immediate
benefits of cooperation (such as the Structural Funds
in the European Union) and the cost of defection (peer
pressure from within the region and loss of reputation
on international markets).
In this particular framework, the probability of
cooperation is enhanced when there are fewer players,
when each player’s discounting of the future benefits
is sufficiently low (i.e., if players are farsighted), when
they are interacting frequently, and when the benefits
and costs associated with each strategy are well
known. Through dialogue and cooperation, systemic
uncertainty will be reduced and welfare gains will
increase. In this case, the outcome of the iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game will result in the repeated
selection of a cooperative strategy in every repetition
of the game. In contrast, cooperation breaks down or
never even begins when there are too many parties,
when players are short-sighted, or when benefit condi-
tions and key parameters are rapidly changing.
From the technical standpoint, regional coopera-
tion is the most appropriate forum when the regional
partners’ economic policies are themselves the source
of externalities, as is the case when instability and lack
of credibility in one country cause contagion of neigh-
bouring economies. Thus, providing the regional insti-
tutional arrangements function well, regional coopera-
tive solutions are at least comparable -if not superior-
to individual national solutions on both technical and
institutional grounds.
Translating these theoretical conclusions into
practical regional economics, this means that countries
which have commercial and financial relations, which
interact frequently, and which cannot escape from the
consequences their decisions have on their partners,
have a strong probability of entering into a cooperative
dynamic which will be beneficial for all the cooperat-
ing participants and will be stable, at least within the
original cluster. All these arguments point in the direc-
tion of a subregional arrangement, at least in the early
phase of policy coordination. From a more political
perspective, the commitment-cum-monitoring tech-
nology deriving from subregional negotiation among
peers is also easier to legitimate than extra-regional
supervision. From a broader perspective, regional
cooperation in the face of large external financial
shocks is also the most appropriate way to face the
asymmetries built into the new international financial
system, where purely national answers are notably
insufficient (Ocampo, 2001). In the present situation,
however, the degree of integration is still too weak for
macroeconomic coordination to be self-enforcing.
Efforts to promote macroeconomic coordination
should be complementary to, and not a substitute for,
more traditional policies designed to deepen trade
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